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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Items 65 and 113 (c) of the
preliminary list*
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY -
PREVENTION OF THE VIOLENT
DISINTEGRATION OF STATES
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATIONS AND REPORTS OF SPECIAL
RAPPORTEURS AND REPRESENTATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 13 March 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the joint declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries of south-eastern Europe, Mr. Andrei Plesu, Mr. Blagoi Handziski, Mr. Ismail Cem, Mrs. Nadezhda Mihaylova and Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, concerning the situation in Kosovo, which was adopted at Sofia on 10 March 1998.

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under items 65 and 113 (c) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Philip DIMITROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/53/50.

ANNEX

Joint declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries of south-eastern Europe concerning the situation in Kosovo, adopted at Sofia on 10 March 1998

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries of south-eastern Europe, Mr. Andrei Plesu, Mr. Blagoi Handziski, Mr. Ismail Cem, Mrs. Nadezhda Mihaylova and Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, express their serious concern with the deteriorating situation in Kosovo and with the grave consequences of an inter-ethnic conflict and its possible spillover in the region.

The Ministers declare the commitment of their States to take all appropriate steps in order to prevent such a development in the region of south-eastern Europe.

The Ministers reiterate that a first step to reduce tensions in Kosovo is the initiation of a genuine dialogue between the Serb authorities and the ethnic Albanians, and call on both parties to take prompt measures to that end. Both parties should condemn and refrain from use of violence as a means to resolve their conflict.

They deeply regret the suppression by the Serbian police of peaceful demonstrations in Kosovo and the subsequent unrestrained use of force that has resulted in fatalities. At the same time, they urge all organizations of the Kosovo Albanian community to make clear their opposition to violence and terrorism as tools to seek change. They condemn terrorist actions to achieve political goals, as well as violence as a means to repress political views.

The Ministers call for the full respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the ethnic Albanian population. They declare that a lasting solution to the Kosovo problem can be based only on the full protection of the rights of Albanians, Serbs and all others living in Kosovo in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki principles and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) standards.

The Ministers call for the immediate and full implementation of the agreement on education concluded in 1996 between President Milosevic and Mr. Rugova, leader of the Albanians in Kosovo.

The Ministers underline that the solution to the Kosovo problem should be sought with full respect to the existing borders. They call on all organizations of the ethnic Albanians to deny any secessionist policies and to respect fully the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Ministers call on Belgrade to face the problems with utmost responsibility and to search for mutually acceptable solutions based on granting a large autonomy for Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Ministers believe that the integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the international community would be to the benefit of that

country and would strengthen the stability of the region. They also recognize that considerable progress towards the solution of the Kosovo issue will contribute to this end.

The Ministers call on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to enable the return of the international monitors in Kosovo as a means of preventive diplomacy.

The Ministers declare the readiness of their States to play an active role in the efforts to find a peaceful and political solution to all issues related to the Kosovo problem. Within this framework, they also welcome the initiatives of the United States of America, the European Union and the Contact Group.

The Ministers call on all States in the region and beyond to support this declaration and to join the efforts towards preserving peace, stability and security in south-eastern Europe.

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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 12 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the note verbale dated 11 March 1998 presented by the Government of Turkey to the Government of Greece for settlement of the problems in the Aegean (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Note verbale dated 11 March 1998 presented by the Government of Turkey to the Government of Greece

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey presents its compliments to the Embassy of Greece and, with reference to the latter's note No. 1323/75/752 dated 26 February 1998, concerning the reply of the Government of Greece to the Turkish Government's proposals conveyed through the Ministry's note verbale No. DHGY-329 dated 12 February 1998, has the honour to communicate the following:

Turkey has given due consideration to the reply put forward by the Government of Greece through the letter dated 20 February 1998 of His Excellency Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, in response to the Turkish proposals contained in its above referred note.

The general conclusion drawn from the content of the said letter is that the Greek Government has declined to consider favourably these proposals and has adopted a negative position.

Turkey is of the opinion that an important opportunity to settle all Turkish-Greek differences by peaceful means and to develop good-neighbourly relations between the two countries which would contribute to peace and security in the region is being disregarded by Greece.

The main cause of the tension prevailing in the Aegean is the existence of unresolved problems between Turkey and Greece. In this light, the position taken by Greece to decline once again peaceful settlement of these disputes is not helpful.

Turkey wishes to avoid further deterioration in our relations. It is determined to pursue its efforts for reaching lasting solutions to the outstanding disagreements and wishes to invite Greece to contribute in good faith to these efforts.

The existence of a number of outstanding differences over the Aegean is an objective reality. This cannot be denied by describing them as unilateral claims. Many of these problems have arisen from one-sided Greek decisions which are in conflict with international law and practice, such as the Greek national airspace claim, which no country recognizes. These disputes are serious. Therefore, their timely identification and settlement require thorough consideration and efforts in goodwill by both Greece and Turkey. It is with this understanding that the starting point of the Turkish peace initiative of 12 February 1998 was to invite Greece to identify jointly the entire set of interrelated problems in the Aegean, as a first step in this process.

The preliminary stage of a dispute settlement process requires the identification of all the problems so that both countries can come to an agreement on determining the appropriate means of settlement to be applied to each of them.

Turkey wishes to urge Greece to desist from the evasive attitude it has persistently adopted towards various Turkish proposals, as it blocks a serious approach to the issues between the two countries.

Turkey genuinely wishes and is committed to the resolution of the outstanding disagreements related to the Aegean through peaceful means, based on mutual consent, including appropriate third-party procedures best suited to their specific nature. The essential requirements such as the form, basis, scope, terms and conditions of such means should necessarily be discussed between the parties.

Turkey is of the opinion that, in the meanwhile, it is essential that both Turkey and Greece should exercise the utmost restraint and refrain from any action that might lead to the aggravation of the situation in the Aegean. It is also imperative that both countries respect each other's legitimate and vital interests and concerns in the Aegean and refrain from unilateral acts, as they have undertaken in the Madrid Declaration. Turkey takes the commitments in the said Declaration seriously and expects Greece to do the same.

Turkey sees no rationale behind the unfavourable reply of the Greek Government to its proposal to formalize the Madrid Declaration of 8 July 1997, since this Declaration embodies important principles which should be respected unreservedly by both countries.

The issue of confidence-building measures was included in the Turkish proposals so that both countries would express a firm and unequivocal commitment to develop and mutually implement them as an integrated whole in collaboration with the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Turkey expects Greece to reaffirm its readiness and political will to implement fully all the confidence-building measures enumerated in the 1988 Memoranda of Understanding, as well as those proposed by the Secretary-General.

Turkey would like to offer the following comments in relation to the arguments raised in the Greek reply of 20 February 1998 concerning acceptance by Turkey of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by a unilateral declaration under article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court. It will be recalled that, in 1993, Greece for the first time recognized the Court's jurisdiction in this sense, but with a reservation. This reservation is unique, since it explicitly aims to exclude certain breaches of contractual obligations, deriving from the provisions of the international agreements, from the jurisdiction of the Court.

The course of action proposed by Turkey is in full conformity with international law and practice and offers a more realistic approach to making progress towards a lasting and comprehensive settlement of the outstanding differences related to the Aegean.

The reply given by Greece regarding the "Wisemen" process does not reflect the realities. The contribution of the Presidency of the European Union to the "Wisemen" procedure has not been more than a facilitating role in exchanging the letters of the Group members. According to its agreed mandate, activation of the "Wisemen" procedure depends solely on the willingness of Turkey and Greece.

In fact, it was because of this lack of willingness on the part of Greece that the Group has been unable to convene since May 1997 and study all disputes between the two countries.

Turkey has always been in favour of meetings between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two countries, as well as between their senior diplomats, with a view to setting in motion a process of peaceful settlement, starting with the identification of issues between Turkey and Greece. The delimitation of the continental shelf which is one of the problems to be resolved shall also be taken up in the context of these discussions. It will be appreciated that meetings to be held on the margins of international gatherings that are not designed for the aforementioned purpose will not provide the best format in view of the nature and seriousness of the Aegean issues that divide our two countries.

Turkey hopes that its aforementioned considerations and views will be studied by the Greek Government in the constructive spirit in which they are presented.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA (MONUA)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1149 (1998) of 27 January 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to submit a comprehensive report, which would also incorporate the update requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 1135 (1997) of 29 October 1997, on the implementation of the timetable approved by the Joint Commission on 9 January 1998 (see S/1998/56, annex). The present report also contains recommendations regarding the reconfiguration of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) before 30 April 1998, as well as preliminary recommendations regarding the United Nations presence in Angola after 30 April 1998.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. During the period under review, in the absence of my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, who resumed his duties in Luanda on 11 March 1998, the Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Behrooz Sadry, conducted, in close collaboration with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), intensive consultations with both the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) with a view to accelerating the completion of the remaining tasks under the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex). However, the failure by UNITA to comply by the end of February with the 9 January 1998 timetable generated tension between the parties on the ground and demanded renewed efforts by the United Nations and the observer States to put the peace process back on track.

3. On 2 March, my Deputy Special Representative and the representatives of the observer States were received by President José Eduardo dos Santos. During the discussion, the President of Angola stressed that UNITA was responsible for major delays in the completion of the demobilization process and extension of State administration. The President strongly believed that more pressure should be exerted on UNITA to ensure that it complies with all of its obligations. While deploring the abuses of power by some elements of the Angolan National

Police (ANP), the President underscored the difficult conditions and hostility they were facing in the former UNITA-held areas.

4. On the same day, Mr. Sadry, accompanied by the representatives of the observer States, met with Mr. Savimbi to impress on him the need for UNITA to take urgent and concrete measures to fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions. In an earlier meeting with Mr. Sadry, on 3 February, Mr. Savimbi had reiterated his commitment to the peace process, but stated that the Government of Angola was harassing, displacing and even killing UNITA representatives and sympathizers in the countryside. He believed this was an attempt to destroy his party. Mr. Savimbi reaffirmed, in principle, his willingness to meet President dos Santos, but expressed serious concern over his security if the meeting were to be held in Luanda. However, at the 2 March meeting, Mr. Savimbi reversed his position and indicated that a meeting with the President and his move to Luanda were now unlikely, owing to the increased attacks against him by the media and the Government. The representatives of the observer States warned Mr. Savimbi that UNITA might face additional measures by the international community if it continued to renege on its responsibilities for the implementation of the 9 January timetable.

5. These efforts yielded results on 6 March 1998, when UNITA finally issued a declaration on the complete demilitarization of its forces. The declaration was based on a compromise between the Government and UNITA, according to which special arrangements would be made to demobilize the remaining registered UNITA troops by mid-March 1998. The declaration should also serve as an important catalyst for the completion of other pending tasks under the Lusaka Protocol, including the legalization of UNITA as a political party and the promulgation into law of the special status of its leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi. On 10 March, MONUA issued a declaration concerning the demilitarization of UNITA, that cleared the way for the legalization of UNITA as political party. This was announced by the Government on 11 March, in accordance with the revised timetable.

6. The Joint Commission also endorsed on 6 March UNITA's declaration and approved a 12-point revised timetable that envisages the implementation of all remaining tasks by 31 March 1998. According to this timetable, the Government was expected to resume the disarming of the civilian population on 6 March. The Government would also declare the legalization of UNITA as a political party and promulgate by 11 March a law granting special status to Mr. Savimbi. On 16 March, all governors, vice-governors and ambassadors nominated by UNITA would be appointed by the Government, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. The normalization of State administration would be concluded by 1 April, with the transfer to central authority of all politically sensitive areas controlled by UNITA, including Andulo and Bailundo.

7. In addition, an agreement was reached on the personal security detachment for Mr. Savimbi, according to which its projected strength of 400 personnel would be reduced gradually to 150 over a period of nine months. These 150 personnel will be deployed in Luanda and other locations where Mr. Savimbi will maintain residences. However, discussions continue on the exact strength of the Luanda detachment; the Government insists on a maximum of 50 security guards, whereas UNITA wishes to have more flexibility concerning this figure.

Discussions also continue on the allocation of office space and accommodation to the UNITA leadership in Luanda.

8. It should be recalled that the 9 January 1998 agreement on the "final" timetable for the implementation of the major tasks under the Lusaka Protocol by 28 February 1998, had raised hopes that the key aspects of the peace process would be concluded in early 1998. Regrettably, by the end of February, only the demobilization of UNITA "residual" troops had been formally declared concluded by the Joint Commission, thus leaving unaccomplished several important aspects of the Lusaka Protocol.

9. Since my last report to the Security Council on Angola dated 12 January 1998 (S/1998/17), some progress has been achieved in the normalization of State administration. To date, State administration authority has been extended to 264 out of a total of 335 localities envisaged in the process. The delay in the normalization of State administration in the UNITA strongholds of Andulo, Bailundo and Mussende, which is due mostly to political considerations, also hinders the establishment of central authority in adjacent areas, where UNITA appears to be maintaining a security perimeter. However, UNITA claims that the delays in the normalization of these areas are mostly due to the conduct of the ANP, which is being accused of gross violations of human rights. At the same time, in some provinces, delays are related to logistical difficulties and security considerations on the part of the Government.

10. During the reporting period, several serious incidents occurred, which disrupted the extension of central authority in Moxico and Malange provinces. The normalization process in Lumbala N'guimbo (Moxico Province) faced a major setback when, on 14 February, UNITA militants raided the ANP post and confiscated their weapons and other equipment. A few days later, in the same province, UNITA elements disarmed police officers deployed at Cazombo, where State administration was established on 24 January. On 17 February, UNITA militants damaged the airfield and two bridges at Cambundi Catembo (Malange Province) before the normalization of State administration in that area. On the following day, also in Malange Province, the normalization process was suspended in Luquembo when a MONUA helicopter transporting United Nations, Government and UNITA representatives to a ceremony for the installation of new administrators was fired upon. On 26 February, the Joint Commission undertook a mission to Cazombo in order to assess the situation on the ground and assist in defusing the tensions. The Joint Commission, while noting the unjustifiably high number of heavy weapons brought to the area by ANP personnel, condemned the incident in Cazombo and urged the UNITA leadership to exert control over its members in order to prevent the recurrence of such hostile acts in the future. Needless to say, harassment and attacks on United Nations personnel by UNITA deserve strong condemnation and should not be tolerated.

11. In a development related to the measures imposed on UNITA by the Security Council in its resolution 1127 (1997) of 28 August 1997, a DC-4 aircraft flying from South Africa to the UNITA stronghold of Andulo was intercepted in Angolan airspace by the Angolan Air Force and was forced to land in Menongue (Cuando Cubango Province) on 20 January. MONUA was not allowed to inspect the aircraft, which, according to the Government of Angola, was carrying supplies for UNITA in contravention of the sanctions regime. On 3 February, another aircraft was

impounded at Luanda airport because it was registered as a plane servicing UNITA-held areas. To the extent possible, MONUA continued to monitor flights into UNITA-controlled areas. According to United Nations observers on the ground, during the month of January, some 40 flights landed at a number of locations controlled by UNITA, compared to 187 flights recorded in December 1997.

12. With regard to the transformation of UNITA's Radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility to be called "Radio Despertar", the 6 March 1998 revised timetable includes an agreement between the Government and UNITA stipulating that Radio Vorgan would cease broadcasting on 31 March 1998. In the meantime, efforts have continued to allow Radio Despertar to become operational as soon as possible by acquiring the necessary equipment. At the 6 March meeting of the Joint Commission, the UNITA delegation promised that, during the interim period, the tone of its radio broadcasts would be moderated.

13. In this respect, as indicated in my last report to the Security Council (S/1998/17), MONUA has been paying particular attention to its public relations efforts aimed at strengthening peace-building and national reconciliation. To this end, United Nations public information officers have been deployed to several politically sensitive areas. The improved outreach will help broaden local political dialogue and public participation in the peace process, as envisioned in the mandate of MONUA.

14. Since the coming into force of the new measures against UNITA on 30 October 1997, 37 Member States have replied to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) on the steps they have taken to implement the sanctions against UNITA. On 19 February 1998, the Committee issued an updated list of UNITA senior officials and adult members of their families who are affected by the sanctions. On 4 March, the President of the Sanctions Committee, Mr. Njuguna M. Mahugu (Kenya), announced his intention to visit Angola and neighbouring countries in order to review the implementation of the sanctions and impress on the parties the need to proceed with the peace process.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

15. Although in February 1998 tensions between the Government and UNITA increased in some areas of the country, the general military situation in Angola has remained relatively stable. Some of the tensions were due to the aggressive conduct of the ANP, which often harasses the local population in the areas where central authority has been recently established. At the same time, the security situation has deteriorated in some parts of Angola as a result of politically motivated attacks instigated by both UNITA "residual" troops and supporters, and Government forces. Overall security has also been affected by the discovery of numerous arms caches and the laying of new mines in Bié Province, which is attributed to UNITA elements.

16. The registration and disarmament of "residual" UNITA troops was announced as completed on 22 December 1997. A total of 7,877 soldiers had been registered after handing over 7,275 weapons, including heavy weapons and ammunition of

various calibres amounting to 57,592,530 rounds. The in situ demobilization of those troops was concluded on 26 February, with the demobilization of 5,857 UNITA troops.

17. As indicated in my report of 12 January 1998, the planned downsizing of the military contingent of MONUA has been accomplished. In accordance with resolution 1149 (1998), the present strength of the MONUA military task force stands at 1,045 personnel, including 4 infantry companies, 45 staff officers and 90 military observers, along with the small helicopter, signals, logistics and medical support units. With the present military force, the United Nations retains a capacity to respond to emergency security needs and continues to assist in the implementation of residual military tasks.

IV. POLICE ASPECTS

18. In view of the substantial withdrawal of MONUA military units and the progress made in the normalization of State administration, the tasks of the civilian police component have increased in terms of both geographical coverage and its impact on the peace process. The presence of civilian police observers in many sensitive localities throughout the country enables MONUA to monitor the conduct of the ANP in order to prevent human rights abuses and to instil much-needed confidence in the civilian population. In addition, United Nations police observers continue to monitor the activities of the rapid reaction police, the effective incorporation of UNITA elements into the ANP and the rapid reaction police and the security arrangements for UNITA leadership, as well as to perform other crucial tasks. These tasks include the investigation of alleged human rights violations and visits to prisons.

19. With the rise in armed banditry, civilian police are increasingly involved in the monitoring of the collection of weapons from the civilian population, which is a high-priority task for the Government. This task includes the disarmament of the civil defence corps, whose existence has been confirmed in many parts of the country. The ANP plan of action for the disarming of civilians in the areas where State administration has recently been established includes three phases, namely, a public awareness campaign, the voluntary hand-over of weapons and enforced collection of unauthorized weapons. This plan, however, has been seriously criticized because its implementation has been limited to the areas formerly controlled by UNITA, where the disarming operations have often been conducted with excessive use of force and without due regard to fundamental freedoms.

20. The United Nations civilian police component has proposed the development of an assistance programme for the training of the ANP and the rapid reaction police in the use of internationally accepted human rights standards and police procedures to facilitate the process of national reconciliation. It is ready to discuss the practical modalities of such a programme with the Government.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

21. The Human Rights Division of MONUA, in collaboration with the Angolan authorities, has intensified its public awareness efforts, especially in Cuando Cubango, Uige and Benguela provinces, where documents prepared by MONUA on the basic principles and standards of human rights have been distributed to law enforcement officials. Active preparations are also under way for the second national seminar and a series of provincial seminars to promote human rights issues. Training workshops on human rights standards will be held for the Government officials involved in law enforcement, including magistrates and administrators of detention facilities.

22. The ad hoc group of the Joint Commission on allegations of human rights violations continued to review reports of human rights abuses and to recommend appropriate action. Most of these alleged abuses, including unlawful detention, torture and killing of innocent civilians, have been committed by the ANP in newly normalized areas. The recommendations of the group were submitted to the Joint Commission for follow-up action by the Government and UNITA. However, the implementation of many of these recommendations has been less than encouraging. This is particularly regrettable considering the need to bring officials to justice in cases of confirmed human rights abuses, including the death of 10 UNITA supporters detained in Malange. Another important task of the Human Rights Division relates to the strengthening and modernization of the Angolan judicial system, which is vital in promoting respect for human rights and building confidence in the legal process.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

23. As a result of prevalent insecurity in some areas, large segments of the local population continued to be displaced. Recently, another 1,200 to 3,000 displaced persons were awaiting permission from the Government and UNITA to return to their villages of origin in Luanda Norte Province. At the same time, humanitarian activities are still suspended or impeded in several localities owing to tensions related to the normalization of State administration.

24. On 13 February, on behalf of the United Nations system, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Ms. Carol Bellamy, launched in Luanda the 1998 consolidated inter-agency appeal for Angola, requesting a total of US$ 91,200,142. The target beneficiaries include 900,000 internally displaced persons, 160,000 Angolan refugees expected to return to the country this year and other war-affected and vulnerable groups. The 1998 appeal underscores the phased and smooth divestment of coordination functions of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs as a result of the expected gradual consolidation of peace and the continued efforts of the Government to assume leadership in the humanitarian sphere. The strategy endorsed by this appeal gives priority to the provision of humanitarian assistance in support of return and resettlement, health and nutrition, agriculture and food security, mine awareness and reintegration of demobilized war-disabled and underage soldiers. The appeal

also calls for the continued support of the international community to strengthen the capacity of the Government of Angola to coordinate and manage the humanitarian response.

25. As the long-term security situation in Angola gradually improves and the need for short-term relief interventions diminishes, the United Nations system is focusing increasingly on ensuring a smooth transition from a complex humanitarian assistance situation to rehabilitation and development. A strategy has been adopted for this purpose under the guidance of the Resident Coordinator, laying out the principles, modalities and required actions. All United Nations agencies and funds will jointly participate in the implementation of this strategy in 1998, thus increasing the impact of their programmes.

26. Following consultations between the Government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, as well as other key donors, agreement was reached in January 1998 concerning the divestiture of demobilization and reintegration activities to UNDP. In view of the proposed phase-out of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit by the end of June 1998, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in consultation with Inter-Agency Standing Committee members, is reviewing humanitarian coordination arrangements for 1998. In their review, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee are taking into consideration both the capacity of the Government and UNDP to assume the humanitarian coordination function and the humanitarian situation in the country. Notwithstanding these consultations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs will maintain a field presence in support of the Humanitarian Coordinator. In this context, UNDP has initiated a project that will strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration to coordinate humanitarian and reintegration activities.

B. Demobilization and social reintegration

27. As at 3 March 1998, 48,027 out of a total of 87,070 registered soldiers had been demobilized. However, the number of absentees (27,291) from the demobilization centres and "residual" troops eligible for demobilization through special arrangements remains a cause of major concern.

28. While the rapid demobilization programme was completed in January 1998 with the closure of the centre for military war-disabled at Mavinga, the demobilization of several special categories of ex-combatants will not be completed before the end of March 1998. However, the Government has pledged that the necessary funds and documents will be available to complete the exercise, as currently planned. At the same time, the Government has yet to indicate the number of excess troops of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the time frame for their demobilization. Some 6,000 FAA war-disabled are being deprived of access to social reintegration programmes, and it is urgent that preparations be initiated for the demobilization of this vulnerable group.

29. Since its inception in August 1996, the Government programme for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers, supported by the Government of Angola, UNDP and other international donors, has offered in all provinces various

services to the demobilized soldiers. These include counselling and referral services, access to quick impact projects and to vocational training, and support for the creation of small businesses. By the end of January 1998, a total of 20,800 demobilized soldiers had been registered by the Counselling and Referral Service (SeCoR). The social reintegration programme has trained special social workers in order to reach ex-soldiers in the most remote areas of the country.

30. Progress has been achieved in the implementation of the social reintegration programme, despite various difficulties encountered since its inception. These difficulties have been caused by delays in the provision of Government subsidies, claims by unregistered soldiers and changes made by most ex-soldiers in their final destinations. Moreover, SeCoR and vocational training programmes funded by the international community face a budgetary shortfall amounting to $10 million. In March 1998, a joint Government/UNDP review of the community rehabilitation and reintegration programme will evaluate its effectiveness in order to make the necessary adjustments.

C. Demining

31. Estimates of the mine pollution in Angola range from 6 to 8 million mine devices planted in over 2,500 minefields, the threat of which has contributed to the displacement of up to one third of the Angolan population and impeded the return of internally displaced persons to their places of origin. As a result, national demining activities have been focused on areas with high population density and those areas which offer particular economic and resettlement potential.

32. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) and MONUA demining programmes and the current programme conducted by UNDP, which supports the National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE), have trained some 50 senior and middle-level managers working at INAROE headquarters and regional offices. More than 500 deminers, mine mappers, surveyors, radio operators and explosive ordnance disposal technicians have also been trained and are fully operational. By the end of 1997, surveys providing information on the general location of mined areas had been completed in 10 of Angola's 18 provinces, where approximately 80 per cent of the Angolan population live; and more than 1,900 mined areas had been identified. However, the INAROE demining brigades have encountered difficulties because of the lack of cooperation from UNITA, and in some cases from the Government, in providing information on minefields. The overall achievements in mine marking and clearance have also been limited owing to the severity of the problem and the shortage of funds and trained personnel.

VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

33. The Angolan economy is still affected by distortions, which were particularly aggravated during the last quarter of 1997, as a result of an increase in the Government's expenditures. This is mostly due to expenses related to the extension of State administration and the payment of salaries and

bonuses to civil servants. The state budget ran into serious deficits, which in turn led to a sharp rise in inflation and a rapid depreciation in the parallel market rate of the national currency. Prices of goods and services have remained generally high, although the Government was able to halt the hyper-inflation that has characterized the economy in the past five years. Unemployment, however, which is currently estimated at 45 per cent, has remained very high, and the urban labour force works increasingly in the informal sector, while 67 per cent of the population live below the poverty line.

34. The Government budget for 1998 and the Government's medium-term programme for economic recovery and stabilization were actively discussed in the National Assembly in February 1998. Budget estimates for the social sector reflected some improvements in public expenditure patterns. Health and education sectors were allocated 8 per cent and 11.7 per cent respectively, a positive trend in meeting social needs and fighting poverty, which remain at the core of the Government's economic programme for the period 1998-2000.

VIII. RECONFIGURATION OF MONUA COMPONENTS BEFORE 30 APRIL 1998

35. In its resolution 1149 (1998), the Security Council requested me to make recommendations regarding the configuration of MONUA before 30 April 1998, when the current mandate of the Mission will expire. In view of the delays in the implementation of key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol and the short period of time remaining until the expiration of the mandate of MONUA, no major changes in the strength and operations of MONUA appear desirable at this time. Nevertheless, it is my intention, subject to conditions on the ground, to resume the gradual downsizing of the military component of the Mission by the end of April. At the same time, the Demobilization and Reintegration Office of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, which was to be funded through the assessed budget until the end of March, will now operate until the end of April, as a result of a recent compromise between the Government and UNITA regarding the special demobilization arrangements for the remaining registered troops.

IX. PROPOSED UNITED NATIONS MANDATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AFTER 30 APRIL 1998

36. As indicated above, despite some progress made in the implementation of the Lusaka agreements, the current political climate in Angola is still characterized by mistrust between the Government and UNITA, and by a sense of insecurity in the Angolan population. While much has been achieved to bring relative stability to the country over the past three years, the peace process continues to demand concerted international efforts to ensure a lasting peace and the reconstruction of the country. Under these circumstances, it would be advisable to maintain a significant United Nations involvement in the peace process in order to promote confidence-building measures, national reconciliation and socio-economic development. To this end, support from the United Nations would be based on close coordination between the good offices of MONUA and the assistance provided by the United Nations system. At the same time, where appropriate, MONUA would begin gradually to transfer some of its responsibilities to United Nations programmes, funds and agencies.

37. It will be recalled that, in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, the United Nations is expected to determine whether requisite conditions for the holding of the second round of the presidential elections have been met, and to provide appropriate support for the verification and monitoring of the electoral process. While in November 1996 the Angolan National Assembly decided to hold the next legislative elections within two to four years, it is not yet clear when exactly the second round of presidential elections will be conducted. At the same time, during his meeting on 2 March 1998 with my Deputy Special Representative, President dos Santos expressed the view that MONUA should continue to be reduced gradually to a structure sufficient for the verification of the next elections and that it should be phased out thereafter. These views have been taken into account in the proposed mandate and concept of operations outlined below.

A. Political, human rights and public awareness aspects

38. Subject to approval by the Security Council, it is envisaged that MONUA will continue, with the necessary adjustments, to carry out its activities on the basis of the mandate and organizational structure contained in my reports of 7 February (S/1997/115) and 5 June 1997 (S/1997/438) to the Security Council, and approved by the Council in its resolutions 1118 (1997) of 30 June 1997 and 1149 (1998).

39. Accordingly, my Special Representative would continue to provide good offices to the Government and UNITA and to chair the Joint Commission. In addition, political affairs and human rights officers would be deployed to the countryside to mediate disputes and promote national reconciliation and respect for human rights. The MONUA information and public awareness programme would continue to provide an important support function by disseminating impartial information about the peace process, human rights and good governance. The political and human rights components and the Public Information Unit would, for the time being, maintain their current strength and composition.

B. Civilian police component

40. In the light of the progress made in the normalization of State administration and the deployment of ANP personnel into newly normalized areas, a substantial revision of the deployment of civilian police is needed. In this context, it is envisaged that the total number of United Nations civilian police locations would be increased from 46 to 51 and additional team sites in Malange, Uigé, Cuanza Sul and Moxico provinces would be opened. The establishment of these new team sites would help monitor the areas where normalization of State administration has recently taken place and which have a strategic significance for the parties. The revised deployment plan would also allow United Nations civilian police observers to have access to most of the municipalities of the country. In line with the proposal contained in my report of 12 January 1998 (S/1998/17), the Security Council may wish to consider the deployment of up to 83 additional civilian police observers. The current authorized strength of the civilian police component stands at 345 officers. This would also enable MONUA to strengthen selected team sites in order to increase the number of daily

patrols and to ensure the timeliness and effectiveness of United Nations verification and investigation. However, the modus operandi of the civilian police component would be kept under constant review, in order to determine whether these tasks can be performed on the basis of a more limited increase in the number of personnel. At the same time, the composition of the component, which should play a pivotal role in the consolidation of peace in the country, would be enhanced with an increase in the number of Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking officers.

C. Military component

41. Depending on the situation on the ground and the progress made in the implementation of residual military tasks, the gradual reduction of the military component of the Mission would resume by the end of April 1998. The withdrawal of all formed units would be completed by July 1998, with the exception of one infantry company, the helicopter unit and the signals and medical support units. However, if significant progress is achieved in the implementation process before that time, the military task force could be repatriated earlier.

42. It is widely recognized that the current 90 military observers should be retained at least through September/October 1998 to allow for the completion of residual tasks, such as the monitoring of the discovery of arms caches and the verification of cease-fire violations.

D. Administrative component

43. Since my last report to the Security Council of 12 January 1998 (S/1998/17), the administrative component of the Mission has continued to carry out simultaneously several key tasks, including logistical support to the withdrawal of formed military units and the closure, reconfiguration and upgrading of a number of military and civilian police team sites. These challenging activities, in addition to the regular maintenance of the Mission, have continued to strain considerably the capabilities of the administrative component. Some additional material and human resources are required to proceed with the liquidation process of UNAVEM III, which is still behind schedule owing to the need to address other pressing logistical tasks. In this connection, the recommendations made in paragraph 39 of my report of 12 January remain valid.

X. OBSERVATIONS

44. The failure to comply with the 9 January 1998 timetable for the implementation of the remaining tasks of the Lusaka Protocol and the ensuing tensions between the Government and UNITA on the ground resulted, once again, in an impasse, which was largely due to the persistent delays and last-minute conditions that have become a constant feature of UNITA tactics.

45. However, it is hoped that the major advance achieved on 6 March 1998 with the adoption of an adjusted timetable will reinvigorate the peace process. I commend the efforts made by the Government and UNITA to reach an agreement on

the completion of the outstanding tasks under the Lusaka Protocol by the end of this month, and urge both parties to abide strictly by the new understanding. It is imperative that both the Government and UNITA, in particular, abide fully by the letter and spirit of the Lusaka Protocol and the relevant Security Council resolutions. I do not believe that the international community is ready to accept continuing procrastination in this regard.

46. It is obvious that the completion of the peace process is contingent upon the full and unconditional demilitarization of UNITA, especially those absentees and residual troops mentioned in paragraph 27 above. It is indispensable that UNITA carry it out on time and in full. Unregistered armed elements continue to be reported in some of the provinces, which does not enhance mutual trust or improve the prospects of national reconciliation. Equally, the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation should show restraint and give priority to peaceful actions that contribute to the successful conclusion of the peace process. It is in this spirit that I also appeal for the earliest resumption of the disarmament of the civilian population throughout the country.

47. Needless to say, I strongly deplore the recent attacks by UNITA on United Nations personnel in several areas in Angola. UNITA should unconditionally guarantee the safety and security of all international staff who have been assisting the Angolan people in their pursuit of a lasting peace.

48. The Lusaka peace process has already made significant progress. Many of the remaining tasks could be completed swiftly, including the full normalization of State administration throughout Angola and the final resolution of all issues related to Mr. Savimbi's security detachment. I also continue to believe that a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi might help accelerate the completion of the peace process. Equally, UNITA leadership should move to Luanda, as agreed upon and envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol.

49. In the meantime, the presence of the United Nations in Angola is still needed. As regards MONUA, it would be my intention, subject to security conditions on the ground and to the concurrence of the Security Council, to proceed with its reconfiguration along the lines described in paragraphs 36 to 44 of the present report. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my strong appeal to the international community to continue its assistance to Angola and, in particular, to respond generously to the 1998 consolidated appeal.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 6 March 1998

	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Grand total
Bangladesh	3	22	3	-	26
Brazil	4	19	-	-	23
Bulgaria	4	19	-	-	23
Congo	3	-	-	-	3
Egypt	3	19	-	-	22
France	3	-	-	-	3
Guinea-Bissau	3	4	-	-	7
Hungary	4	7	-	-	11
India	5	22	15	169	191
Jordan	5	26	-	-	31
Kenya	3	-	3	-	6
Malaysia	4	24	-	-	28
Mali	3	19	1	-	23
Namibia	-	-	-	150	150
New Zealand	3	-	-	-	3
Nigeria	6	32	-	-	38
Norway	3	-	-	-	3
Pakistan	3	-	1[b]	-	4
Poland	4	-	-	-	4
Portugal	4	35	6	180	225
Romania	-	-	4	146	150
Russian Federation	3	-	-	130	133
Senegal	4	-	-	-	4
Slovakia	5	-	-	-	5
Sweden	3	21	-	-	24
Ukraine	3	5	1	-	9

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	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Grand total
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	3	25	-	-	28
Zambia	3	24	3	150	180
Zimbabwe	4	22	12		38
Total	98	348	49	905	1 400

[a] Including military police.

[b] A military specialist in the demining school.



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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 37
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 13 March 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning Israel's attacks on southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa and the arbitrary practices against the civilian inhabitants in which it engages on a daily basis, I have the honour to notify you of the series of such incidents that took place in February 1998.

1 February 1998

At 1025 hours Israeli warplanes attacked the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills in the Iqlim al-Tuffah area firing air-to-surface missiles.

At 1220 hours the southern outskirts of Mashgharah came under Israeli artillery fire. Two mortar shells fell near residential localities, and three persons were wounded and a number of dwellings were damaged.

At 1230 hours clashes erupted in the Tumat Niha area of Jazzin district between Lahad militia elements and men of the Lebanese Resistance in which all types of weapons were used. Calm was restored at about 1330 hours.

2 February 1998

At 0630 hours outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks there came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 0945 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes.

At 0950 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps.

At 1100 hours outlying areas of Jba' and Kafr Fila and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1200 hours the security situation in the Jabal al-Rayhan area of Jazzin district grew tense and clashes erupted between Israeli and Lahad militia forces on the one hand and men of the Lebanese National Resistance on the other. All types of weapons were used, and several shells fell on Rayhan town and damaged a number of dwellings.

At 1900 hours the vicinity of the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa came under Israeli artillery fire and received bursts of fire from other weapons.

3 February 1998

At 0800 hours outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Mansuri, Hinniyah and Izziyah came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 0930 hours Israeli forces closed the Kafr Hunah - Marj Uyun crossing.

At 1015 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area.

At 1100 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1430 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes.

At 1455 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Na'imah hills in Shuf district at medium altitudes.

At 1730 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim, Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar, Luwayzah, Jba' and Ayn Qana and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 2200 hours a number of artillery shells fell in the vicinity of the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa.

4 February 1998

At 0940 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at low altitudes and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1020 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at low altitudes and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1230 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Dayr al-Qamar at low altitudes and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1430 hours outlying areas of Jba', Ayn Bu Siwar and Jarju' and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1600 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes carrying out mock attacks and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

At 1600 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Mashgharah, Ayn al-Tinah and Saydun in Western Bekaa district.

At 1630 hours hostile aircraft bombarded the Zillaya water system along the Litani River.

At 2030 hours the vicinity of the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah al-Fawqa came under artillery fire and received bursts of fire from other weapons fired from enemy positions.

5 February 1998

At 1630 hours outlying areas of Jba', Ayn Bu Siwar and Ayn Qana and the Mlita and Jabal Safi hills came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1800 hours the Iqlim al-Tuffah area came under Israeli artillery fire.

6 February 1998

At 1200 hours Yatar and its outlying areas came under Israeli artillery fire. One person, Nazim Qaduh, was seriously wounded and many dwellings were damaged.

At 0630 hours outlying areas of Majdal Zun, Mansuri, Hinniyah, Izziyah and Qulaylah came under Israeli artillery fire. It continued until 0800 hours.

7 February 1998

At 0600 hours outlying areas of Kafra, Yatar, Haris, Sadaqa, Ayta al-Jabal, Majdal Silm and Tulin came under Israeli artillery fire. One person was injured and many dwellings were damaged.

At 0800 hours outlying areas of Zibqin, Jibal al-Butm and Siddiqin in Tyre district came under Israeli artillery fire. It continued for one hour.

At 0830 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes.

8 February 1998

At 1300 hours outlying areas of Kafra and Yatar came under Israeli artillery fire.

10 February 1998

At 1130 hours towns of Luwayzah and Mlikh and areas along the Litani River came under Israeli artillery fire.

11 February 1998

At 1315 hours outlying areas of Libbaya in Western Bekaa district came under intermittent artillery fire.

12 February 1998

At 1110 hours Israeli warplanes flew over the Nabatiyah area and over Janta, Yahrufa and Nabi Shit in Baalbek district at low altitudes. They were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire.

13 February 1998

At 1030 hours hostile aircraft overflew the Nabatiyah area at low altitudes.

At 1530 hours outlying areas of Yatar came under Israeli artillery fire. It was calculated that some 15 artillery shells of miscellaneous calibre fell there.

At 2150 hours outlying areas of Kafr Rumman came under Israeli artillery fire.

14 February 1998

At 2300 hours a rocket-propelled projectile fell on a dwelling in Shihin, Tyre district, and five persons were wounded.

Kafr Rumman came under hostile bombardment that affected residential areas and damaged many dwellings.

At 1145 hours the Israeli artillery bombardment of outlying areas of Kafr Rumman was resumed. It extended to the Habbush vicinity.

At 1240 hours outlying areas of Arabsalim and Humin al-Fawqa, areas along the Zahrani River and the Habbush bridge came under Israeli artillery fire. One person was wounded.

At 2200 hours outlying areas of Majdal Silm, Bra'shit, Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal, Kafra and Yatar came under Israeli artillery fire.

16 February 1998

At 1500 hours elements of the militia of the client Lahad proceeded to detain two residents of Sha'ba in Hasbayya district.

At 0630 hours outlying areas of Majdal Silm, Khirbat Silm, Jumayjimah and Sawwanah came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 1410 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Sidon and the nearby camps at medium altitudes and were met by ground-based anti-aircraft fire from units belonging to the Lebanese Army.

17 February 1998

At 0000 hours outlying areas of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and the vicinity of the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks came under Israeli artillery fire.

20 February 1998

At 0000 hours outlying areas of Zibqin and Jibal al-Butm in Tyre district came under Israeli artillery fire.

At 0100 hours a Palestinian was wounded when an Israeli helicopter strafed an outlying area of Jibal al-Butm.

23 February 1998

At 1240 hours Israeli warplanes flew over the South at high altitudes.

At 1725 hours Israeli forces and the militia of the client Lahad fired a number of mortar shells that fell along the Nab' al-Tasah and in the vicinity of Mazra'at Uqmata.

At 1850 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the Tyre and Tibnin areas and over the sea at different altitudes.

24 February 1998

At 0345 hours an Israeli helicopter fired a missile at a civilian vehicle travelling along a secondary road in Majdal Silm.

At 1140 hours the militia of the client Lahad strafed areas around its position on Anan hill with medium-weapons fire.

At 1320 hours Israeli forces fired three shells at Jabal Ayn al-Tinah from their position in Tumat Jazzin.

At 1320 hours the militia of the client Lahad fired a number of artillery shells from its position in Zafatah. They fell in outlying areas of Jba' and Mazra'at Kafra.

At 1330 hours the militia of the client Lahad fired a number of artillery shells from its position in Zafatah. They fell in outlying areas of Jba' and Mazra'at Kafra.

At 1605 hours the militia of the client Lahad prevented the inhabitants of Hula, Mays al-Jabal, Blida and Aytrun from going out to the liberated areas.

At 2035 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Tyre area at high altitude.

At 2130 hours an Israeli gunboat at sea off Qulaylah fired a number of medium-weapons bursts in various directions.

25 February 1998

At 1125 hours Israeli reconnaissance aircraft flew over the South at high altitudes.

At 1205 hours Israeli and Lahad militia forces fired a number of artillery shells from their positions in Shuray'ah, Ksarat al-Arus, Tall Ya'qub, Tall Sujud and Jabal Balat at Mazra'at Uqmata, Wadi Basil and areas along the Nab' al-Tasah.

At 1335 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Jabal Bir al-Dahr.

At 1845 hours an Israeli gunboat at sea off Mansuri fired a number of bursts.

At 2115 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Tyre area at high altitude.

At 2145 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Tyre area at high altitude.

At 0100 hours the Lahad militia fired a mortar shell from Sujud hill. It fell on Jabal Safi.

26 February 1998

At 0115 hours Israeli forces fired a number of mortar shells from their position in Ksarat al-Arus. They fell in Mazra'at Uqmata.

At 0150 hours occupation forces fired a number of illumination flares from their position in Qal'at al-Shaqif (Chateau de Beaufort) over areas along the Litani River towards Zawtar al-Gharbiyah.

At 0500 hours an Israeli gunboat at sea off Mansuri fired a number of bursts.

At 0615 hours occupation forces and the militia of the client Lahad on Dabshah hill fired a number of shells. They fell on the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah.

At 0740 hours occupation forces at Abu Qamhah fired 16 artillery shells towards Jabal Bir al-Dahr.

At 1640 hours occupation forces and the militia of the client Lahad fired a number of artillery shells and bursts of fire from other weapons from their positions at Tall Ya'qub, Jabal Balat and Ksarat al-Arus and on Sujud hill at

outlying areas of Yatar, Jibal al-Butm, Majdal Zun, Mansuri, Izziyah, Zibqin, Jarju', Arabsalim and Humin al-Fawqa, areas along the Nab' al-Tasah, Jabal al-Rafi' and areas around Sujud hill.

At 1935 hours the militia of the client Lahad strafed the areas around its position at Dahr al-Mashnaqah with medium-weapons fire.

At 2110 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Tyre area at high altitude.

At 2215 hours elements from the militia of the client Lahad on Anan hill threw hand-grenades into the surrounding area.

At 2250 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Tyre area at high altitude.

27 February 1998

At 0300 hours the militia of the client Lahad strafed the area around its position on Rum hill with medium-weapons fire.

At 0400 hours an Israeli gunboat at sea off Qulaylah fired a number of bursts in various directions.

At 1620 hours enemy forces and the militia of the client Lahad fired a number of mortar shells from their positions in Ksarat al-Arus and on Sujud hill. They fell on Mazra'at Uqmata.

28 February 1998

At 0650 hours the Lahad militia fired a number of shells and bursts of machine-gun fire from its position on Rum hill towards Mu'aytah.

At 0740 hours enemy forces fired a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire from their position on Dabshah hill at the abandoned Lebanese Army barracks in Nabatiyah.

At 0755 hours Israeli forces fired a number of artillery shells from Abu Qamhah towards the Iqlim al-Tuffah area.

At 0955 hours the Lahad militia fired a number of shells from Razlan hill and Shaqif. They fell on Jabal Safi.

At 1335 hours the militia of the client Lahad fired some bursts towards Wadi Mimis from its position in Ayn Qinya.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns the continued Israeli occupation and the fresh attacks and arbitrary practices against the civilian Lebanese population that have left a number of wounded and caused further serious damage to property.

Like previous attacks, this new series is in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and constitutes a breach of the purposes

and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of basic human rights.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/1998/238
16 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 MARCH 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 11 March 1998, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I would appreciate your bringing it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

98-06528 (E) 160398

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Annex

Letter dated 11 March 1998 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I enclose herewith the fourteenth monthly report on the operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) (see appendix). I would appreciate your making the report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Fourteenth monthly report to the Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force

1. There are approximately 35,000 troops currently deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 20 non-NATO countries.

2. Over the reporting period (21 January-20 February), the Stabilization Force (SFOR) continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols. A total of 2,750 sorties were flown by combat aircraft, with the SFOR helicopter fleet flying 203 hours. Between 8 and 13 February commanders and staff from the countries contributing forces to SFOR's Strategic Reserve Force (Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Turkey, United States of America) deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct pre-exercise reconnaissance in preparation for Exercise Dynamic Response '98, a deployment exercise for SFOR's strategic reserve, which will take place between 25 March and 7 April.

3. Over the reporting period, SFOR continued to secure the transmission towers used by Srpska Radio Television (SRT) at Duga Nijva, Udrigovo and Veliki Zep in Multinational Division North (MND(N)) and at Trebevic and Leotar in MND (South-East). On 13 February, interim arrangements for the management of the SRT were signed by President Biljana Plavšić, the Republika Srpska Minister of Information and the Senior Deputy High Representative. Discussions between SFOR and the Republika Srpska Government are under way to reach agreement on transferring control and security of the SRT towers.

4. On 22 January, in support of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, SFOR troops in Bijeljina detained a person indicted for war crimes. He was subsequently transported to The Hague. On 14 February, two others voluntarily surrendered to SFOR troops in Bosanski Šamac. They too were subsequently transported to The Hague.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

5. The parties remain generally compliant with most military aspects of the Peace Agreement across the whole area of operations. However, over the reporting period, there has been increased tension in Drvar, in MND (South-West), and in Stolac in MND (South-East). In Drvar, which has been identified as a priority area for minority refugee returns in 1998, 14 Bosnian Serb homes have been destroyed by arson since 31 January. Serbs from the town have expressed their desire to return but have been hampered by the arson attacks. Bosnian Croat local police have been accused by the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) of participation in the arson attacks and of mistreating Bosnian Serb refugees. At the beginning of February, in Stolac, the Bosnian Croat Chief of Police was decertified by the IPTF and subsequently relieved of his duties by the cantonal authorities, following accusations that he had given tacit approval for attacks against Bosniac and Serb refugees trying to return to the area.

6. On 11 February, a weapons amnesty programme was publicly launched. The Bosnian Presidency's Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) and the armed forces of both entities expressed their support for the amnesty and the entities have agreed to issue the appropriate legislation by 19 March. The programme will be in two phases, the first focusing on mines, ordnance and warlike matériel and the second on weapons. This initiative will be led by the entities, with the support of SFOR and other international organizations in theatre, in particular the Office of the High Representative and IPTF. Local police are taking the lead in organizing and running the amnesty, with the entity armed forces providing support in the handling of mines and explosives. SFOR will provide the appropriate assistance. The collection period will last from 2 March to 15 April.

7. At the meeting of the Joint Military Commission on 16 February, the SFOR Deputy Commander, Operations, issued instructions to the parties requiring them to reduce both combat and infrastructure sites by a further 25 per cent to approximately 400 sites. The execution of this programme will begin on 1 May 1998, following approval by SFOR of the entities' plans, and will end on 20 December 1998.

8. The Republika Srpska Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade remains subject to the control of SFOR. A ban on all activities continues to be imposed on the Brigade until further notice owing to its non-compliance with the instructions of the SFOR Commander. On 12 February, SFOR convened a Joint Special Police Subcommission meeting in Bijeljina to discuss bringing the Police Unit for the Protection of People and Buildings under SFOR control. SFOR will shortly issue an amended set of instructions for specialist police, confirmation of the buildings and VIPs to be guarded and any other special compliance instructions regarding personnel lists and the structure of specialist police units.

9. Over the reporting period, SFOR carried out a total of 383 military weapons storage sites inspections: 107 Bosniac, 117 Bosnian Croat, 7 Federation and 152 Bosnian Serb. The following weapons were confiscated: from the Bosniacs, 80 kilograms of non-authorized explosives; from the Bosnian Croats, 4,700 small arms rounds; and from the Bosnian Serbs, 1 rocket-propelled grenade launcher, 7,145 rocket-propelled grenades, 18 rifle grenades, 97 hand grenades, 3 mortar shells, 12 mines, 46 long-barrelled weapons and 24,116 small arms rounds.

10. SFOR continues to support, on a case-by-case basis, the IPTF-led inspections of local police stations. Weapons in excess of the expected inventory are immediately confiscated and subsequently destroyed. Over the reporting period the following weapons were confiscated: from the Federation, 26 grenades, 3 mines, 10 rifles, 1 long-barrelled weapon and 828 small arms rounds; and from the Republika Srpska, 2 rifles, 19 grenades, 306 small arms rounds and 5 120-mm mortar rounds.

11. Over the reporting period, no unauthorized checkpoints were reported. The new common licence plate approved by the High Representative in January was made available to the public on 15 February and will be compulsory for all vehicles within Bosnia and Herzegovina from 31 July 1998. With effect from 30 April, the new licence plates will be mandatory for any vehicle-owner wishing to travel abroad.

12. During the reporting period, SFOR troops monitored a total of 508 training and movement activities: 124 Bosniac, 65 Bosnian Croat, 114 Federation and 205 Bosnian Serb. On 31 January, SFOR lifted the ban that had been placed on the Butila Unit of the Federation Rapid Reaction Brigade for non-compliance during the elections and for threatening behaviour. Currently there are no training and movement bans imposed on either armed force.

13. Over the reporting period, SFOR monitored 170 demining operations carried out by the entity armed forces: 54 by the Bosniacs; 95 by the Bosnian Croats; and 21 by the Bosnian Serbs. Both entities continue to demonstrate satisfactory compliance with the counter-mine campaign. The SFOR programme to train deminers is running smoothly, with 76 students graduating at the end of January (30 Bosnian Serb, 30 Bosniac and 16 Bosnian Croat). The entities began their own courses on 16 February, with the graduates from the first SFOR course acting as instructors.

14. The last meeting of the Subregional Consultative Commission discussed modalities for reconfiguring a limited number of tanks for use in demining. Progress in this area continues and the entities are working closely with SFOR in their efforts to move the process forward.

Cooperation with international organizations

15. Within its capabilities, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre, working routinely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Office of the High Representative, IPTF, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

16. SFOR is continuing to support the installation phase of the municipal elections, primarily through providing a secure environment and area security, and through participation in the OSCE election results implementation committees at regional levels. On 31 January, SFOR supported the meeting of the Republika Srpska National Assembly in Banja Luka by ensuring a safe environment and freedom of movement to and from the city for all Assembly members. On 4 February, SFOR supported the inaugural meeting of the Zepce Municipal Council and, between 10 and 19 February provided a safe environment for, and movement to, the Municipal Council meeting in Srebrenica.

17. SFOR continues to provide assistance to the Office of the High Representative in the field of civil air traffic, with particular reference to expanding civil air operations at Sarajevo airport. SFOR has held several meetings with airlines and the Office of the High Representative to facilitate future commercial activity within the country and has provided advice on resolving the problems caused by the lack of a bilateral airspace agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

18. SFOR has continued to provide support to the efforts of the Office of the High Representative to establish common institutions, with particular emphasis on the Standing Committee on Military Matters. The Standing Committee met on 11 February and was briefed by a representative from NATO headquarters on NATO's proposed security cooperation activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The

Standing Committee also discussed military representation abroad and agreed that, initially, representatives would be posted to Washington, Brussels and Vienna. It was further agreed that they would represent the entities and Bosnia and Herzegovina and would submit reports to the Presidency, the Standing Committee and the Ministries of Defence. The next meeting of the Standing Committee is provisionally scheduled for 18 March.

19. SFOR continues to develop proposals to increase support for the return of displaced persons and refugees, including through additional support to the Reconstruction and Return Task Force chaired by the Office of the High Representative.

Outlook

20. Tension is likely to rise in Brčko in anticipation of the arbitration decision, which is expected in mid-March. SFOR will continue to contribute to a secure environment by enhancing patrols in the area.

21. On 20 February, following consultations with the non-NATO countries contributing to SFOR, the North Atlantic Council agreed that, subject to the necessary mandate from the Security Council, NATO is prepared to organize and lead a multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the end of SFOR's current mandate in June 1998.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/239
16 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. We refer to the letters of 2 and 4 March 1998 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations (S/1998/179 and S/1998/192) in advance of the sanctions review held on 6 March, seeking the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Libya by the Security Council or their suspension. The outcome of that sanctions review was that the Council made no change to the sanctions regime. Nevertheless those letters, which seriously misrepresent the effect of the recent judgments of the International Court of Justice (S/1998/191), require correction.

2. The cases filed by Libya on 3 March 1992 against our two Governments before the International Court of Justice claim that our Governments' demand for the surrender for trial of the two Libyan citizens accused of perpetrating the Lockerbie outrage are in breach of Libya's rights under the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Before those applications had been brought to the Court, the Security Council had already called upon Libya to provide an effective response to the demands for surrender (resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992). In default of an effective response, the Council then imposed sanctions on Libya by resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, which it subsequently strengthened - still in default of an effective Libyan response - by resolution 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993. In Orders dated 14 April 1992, the International Court of Justice ruled, inter alia, that resolution 748 (1992) prima facie imposed binding obligations on all three parties. Under the Charter of the United Nations, these prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement, including the Montreal Convention.

3. In its Memorial, Libya subsequently asked the International Court to rule that the resolutions of the Security Council were invalid and unlawful, or that they were "inopposable to Libya". Our two Governments then filed formal Preliminary Objections asking the Court to dismiss the case at the preliminary stage. The International Court gave its decision on these Preliminary Objections on 27 February 1998. These Preliminary Objections asked the Court to

dismiss the Libyan claims at the preliminary stage, and without full argument, on three grounds:

jurisdiction: (a) that the Libyan claims were not within the Court's jurisdiction in that they disclosed no real dispute between Libya and our two Governments under the Montreal Convention;

admissibility: (b) that the Libyan claims were inadmissible in the light of the Security Council resolutions; or, alternatively

(c) the Court should in any event dismiss the Libyan claims as being without object, given the overriding legal effect of the Security Council resolutions.

4. In its judgments the Court dismissed the first two of these three Objections. It held that there was a dispute relating to the Montreal Convention which could be decided by the Court. The Court said that both the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of any claim had to be determined at the moment Libya's claims were first filed. Because resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) were adopted after the filing of the Libyan applications, they were disregarded for the purpose of the first two Objections, and for these purposes alone.

5. The third of the Objections was, however, held by the Court not to have an "exclusively preliminary character" and it could therefore not be decided at the preliminary stage. As a result, its substance must now be further argued by the parties and decided in due course by the Court at the end of the proceedings. As is normal for such a finding, the Court has not pronounced in any way on the substance of the third Objection; rather, it explicitly stated that it will be able to consider this Objection when it reaches the merits of the case, that is to say, the hearing of the full argument (paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgments on the applications filed against the United Kingdom and the United States respectively). The Court has in no way suggested that the Security Council was under any obligation to suspend or modify its decisions; indeed, the Court had already in 1992 rejected Libya's request for an injunction to prevent further actions by the Council.

6. It follows that the Libyan letter is highly misleading when it suggests that anything in the judgments affects the resolutions of the Security Council. The resolutions remain in full force and effect. Libya must comply with them as required by the Charter. The Libyan letter confuses the judgments of the International Court which, as explained above, were on preliminary jurisdictional issues, with the substance of Libya's own claims, in which it asks the Court to invalidate the Council's decisions. The Court has not pronounced on the merits of Libya's claims in any way. They will be vigorously resisted by our two Governments in the further argument before the Court.

7. A decision by the International Court of Justice on Preliminary Objections lodged with it has a purely procedural character affecting future proceedings in the case. It does not, and cannot, constitute a final "judgment" of the kind referred to in Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. The Court's decisions in the present matter require, in any case, no

enforcement. Our two Governments, out of the high respect they have for the International Court of Justice, will proceed in the light of its findings that it has jurisdiction and will avail themselves of their full rights to deploy further legal argument rebutting Libya's claims at the merits stage.

8. It is important to be clear what the cases before the International Court of Justice are not about. They are not a determination of the criminal case against the accused. The Court has no jurisdiction to try criminal cases and has not asserted such jurisdiction. The case against the two accused can only be determined once they are brought for trial in a criminal court. And the cases are not about the International Court of Justice deciding where the criminal trial should be held. The Court does not have jurisdiction to decide on the appropriate manner for the accused to be tried. Instead, the Court has held that it has jurisdiction to determine, under the Montreal Convention, whether our two Governments' demand for surrender of the accused (endorsed by the Security Council) are or are not in breach of Libya's rights under that Convention.

We would be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sir John WESTON
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
United Kingdom Permanent
Representative

(Signed) A. Peter BURLEIGH
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
United States Acting
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/53/86
S/1998/240
17 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Item 113 (b) of the preliminary list*
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS, INCLUDING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 16 March 1998 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter dated 15 March 1998 from Mr. Mirko Marjanović, President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, to Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

I would be very grateful if you would kindly circulate the text of the present letter and its annex as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 113 (b) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/53/50.

ANNEX

Letter dated 15 March 1998 from the President of the Government of the Republic of Serbia to the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross

Terrorism has become, as you know, a great danger to modern humanity. No one can deny the legitimate right of every country to fight against this common evil by any means necessary.

I assure you that the recent actions of police forces of the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija have been carried out exclusively in the function of combating terrorism, which escalated in the past months, bringing about suffering of a great number of innocent citizens. The Serbs and the members of the police force were not the only victims of ever more frequent terrorist attacks; even a greater number of victims were from among the members of the Albanian national minority, only because they expressed their loyalty to the State which they live in.

Instead of showing understanding for justified measures undertaken against terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, diverse disinformation emerged followed by unfounded criticism of the actions of state authorities of the Republic of Serbia.

I wish to assure you that the authorities of the Republic of Serbia make a clear distinction between terrorists and terrorism on the one hand, and the members of national minorities, on the other. The measures undertaken, of an exclusively defensive nature, aimed against unscrupulous and well-organized terrorist attacks, were strictly limited and have been carried out respecting the regulations and the security of citizens and their property.

Appreciating as we do the experiences and the reputation of your organization throughout the world, as well as its status, I wish to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Serbia would gladly accept the presence of an ad hoc delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Kosovo and Metohija, which would have the opportunity to obtain first-hand knowledge of the actual state of affairs.

Having all that in mind, I take this opportunity to invite you to designate an ad hoc team of impartial and recognized experts, with equitable representation from different countries, which would, in cooperation with the experts of the Yugoslav Red Cross, be informed on site, through the inspection of forensic documentation, of the facts concerning the actions undertaken against the terrorist in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as of the consequences of the terrorist attacks on Serbs, policemen and the members of the Albanian national minority.

The authorities of the Republic of Serbia are ready, as may be necessary after the inspection of forensic documentation, to exhume the bodies of the buried victims for the purposes of the representatives of your ad hoc team, in order to eliminate all suspicions and to obtain a clear picture of the consequences of the terrorists' actions and the fight against terrorism.

(Signed) Mirko MARJANOVIĆ
President of the Government
of the Republic of Serbia

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/52/831
S/1998/241
17 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 13 March 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 13 March 1998, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-06785 (E) 170398

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ANNEX

Letter dated 13 March 1998 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 26 February 1998 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations (A/52/808-S/1998/173), which contains unfounded allegations regarding cultural property in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The Greek Cypriot representative once again refers to the TRNC as an "occupied area". I wish to underline that the only occupation in Cyprus is the 35-year-old usurpation and occupation of the seat of government of the once bi-communal Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot regime in the South.

Allegations on the so-called "destruction of the cultural identity" of Northern Cyprus have been amply dealt with in our previous communications addressed to Your Excellency, most recently in my letter dated 3 March 1998. Suffice it to say that it is the Greek Cypriot side that has always tried to wipe out the Turkish-Muslim heritage of Cyprus, in particular during the years between 1963 and 1974 when, in the process of a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing directed against the Turkish Cypriot people, mosques, shrines and other places of Muslim worship in 103 villages across the island were destroyed. Today, the Greek Cypriot administration is still perpetuating a policy of religious intolerance and showing undisguised contempt towards the Islamic heritage in South Cyprus. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot side is doing its utmost to hamper the efforts of the TRNC authorities to secure financial and technical assistance from international organizations which would contribute towards the preservation of the antiquities and the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus.

The Greek Cypriot representative specifically makes allegations in his letter concerning the Armenian monastery of St. Makar in the TRNC. These allegations are totally unfounded and are designed to mislead world public opinion on the state of historic sites in Northern Cyprus and the ongoing preservation efforts. Firstly, there are no plans for the conversion of the said monastery into a hotel. Secondly, it should be pointed out that if indeed there had been plans to put the monastery into everyday use, this would be in accordance with the relevant international instruments under which the conservation of historical buildings through use is not only permissible but also recommended. The TRNC Department of Antiquities and Museums has plans for the restoration of the Armenian monastery of St. Makar through a project involving a private institution with expertise in this field.

It is evident, therefore, that the Greek Cypriot allegations concerning the monastery of St. Makar in particular, and the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus in general, are baseless and politically motivated. Our relevant authorities are working assiduously at the task of preserving the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot side should be strongly urged by

all concerned to cease all efforts to exploit the issue as a propaganda device, while the blocking the provision of aid to the TRNC authorities for the upkeep of cultural property.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/242
17 March 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to attach the text of resolution 8/25-P, concerning the crisis between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on the one hand and the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the other, issued by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at its twenty-fifth session, held from 15 to 17 March 1998 in Doha, Qatar.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abuzed Omar DORDA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-06805 (E) 170398 170398

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Annex

[Original: Arabic and English]

Resolution 8/25-P on the crisis between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on the one hand, and the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the other

The twenty-fifth session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of a Better Future for the Peoples of the Islamic Ummah), held in Doha, State of Qatar, from 17 to 19 Dhul Qaadah, 1418H (15-17 March 1998),

Having considered the item concerning the current crisis between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on the one hand, and the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the other, and having also considered the relevant report of the Secretary-General,

Guided by the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which calls for solidarity among the member States,

Emphasizing the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which stipulate that all Member States are committed to refrain from the use or the threat of use of force in their international relations and to settle their disputes by peaceful means,

Taking note of the verdict given by the International Court of Justice on 27 February 1998 related to its competence, in which it agreed to consider the case, thus putting the case back on legal track,

Expressing deep appreciation of the position and the positive initiatives undertaken by the Great Jamahiriya aimed at finding a peaceful solution to this crisis that will be acceptable to all parties;

Referring to the resolutions of previous Islamic Conferences, the resolutions and declarations adopted by regional organizations, especially the resolutions passed by the League of Arab States and the declaration adopted by the Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-third session, held in Harare from 2 to 4 June 1997, and the Final Communiqué of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, resolutions which stipulate that, inter alia, if these Western States persist in their refusal to respond to the positive initiatives put forward by the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which are always supported by the said regional organizations, those organizations will look into other means of alleviating the sufferings of the Libyan people,

Expressing its regret at the disregard and neglect, by the other parties concerned, of the initiatives of the Great Jamahiriya and the constructive efforts exerted by regional organizations to settle this crisis,

Expressing its deep concern at the humanitarian and material damage inflicted upon the Libyan Arab people and the peoples of neighbouring States as a result of the unjust sanctions imposed in implementation of Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993),

Reaffirming the risks posed by the continuation of this crisis to the security and safety of this region and their adverse effect on international peace and security,

1. Calls upon the parties concerned to take the necessary steps to implement the verdict of the International Court of Justice;

2. Reiterates the resolutions of previous Islamic Conferences on solidarity with the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which support the latter's just position and constructive efforts aimed at reaching a peaceful solution to the crisis, the latest being the resolution of the Tehran Islamic Summit;

3. Welcomes the verdict of the International Court of Justice of 27 February 1998, stipulating that it is competent to look into the case, and takes note of the clarifications given by the delegation of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

4. Urges the Security Council to immediately suspend the sanctions imposed upon Libya by Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) until the International Court of Justice delivers a final judgement on the case referred to it in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to relieve the suffering of the Libyan Arab people and to put the case back on legal track;

5. Invites Member States to actively participate in the open-ended Security Council meeting scheduled for 20 March 1998 to consider the issue with a view to considering the question of suspending the sanctions imposed on the Libyan Arab people;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with regional organizations to make joint efforts in the Security Council and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to end the crisis, and to submit his report thereon to the twenty-sixth session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.

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Security Council

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S/1998/243
17 March 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BURUNDI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Burundi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burundi, Mr. Luc Rukingama, has entrusted me with the task of expressing to you and all the members of the Security Council all the appreciation of the Government of Burundi for holding an informal meeting of the Council on the basis of the Arria Formula in order to exchange views with the Minister on the recent political developments in the Republic of Burundi.

I should like to take this opportunity to transmit to you the text of his statement to the Security Council and request you to have it circulated as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Gamaliel NDARUZANIYE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-06847 (E) 180398 180398

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Annex

Statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burundi to the members of the Security Council at Headquarters, New York, on 17 March 1998

1. It is a pleasure for us at the outset to express appreciation to the authorities of the Security Council and to the United Nations Secretariat for enabling us to inform this august assembly about Burundi during our brief visit to New York.

1. The Burundian crisis

2. For four years, Burundi has been experiencing one of the most serious political crises of its history. After the tragedy of October 1993, which was marked by the assassination of President Ndadaye and acts of genocide causing the death of hundreds of thousands of people, the social and political situation deteriorated dangerously owing to the inability of successive governments to manage the crisis. The lack of authority on the part of the State prolonged the disorder to the extent that there was total confusion in Burundi by the middle of 1996: continual strikes, work stoppages virtually everywhere, the closing of schools, widespread violence in the streets and public markets, the cutting off of water and electricity and so forth.

3. In view of such a desperate situation, President Pierre Buyoya returned to public affairs in order to halt the violence and dispel a spectre of genocide. Our Government undertook, from its first hours of existence, to organize a peace process based on a dialogue without exclusion and political negotiations open to all parties. It committed itself to restoring peace and security, the prerequisites for the democratization process.

2. The security improves

4. Throughout the territory of Burundi, peace is gradually returning in towns and in the countryside. The population had resumed its everyday activities and the young people have returned to school. Nevertheless, isolated and sporadic acts are perpetrated here and there by tribal groups bent on genocide. These terrorists are encouraged by the lack of any pressure on the part of the international community, by the countries that shelter them and by the economic sanctions which were imposed almost two years ago on the population and the Government and considerably limit the means for protecting innocent people.

5. Resolving the question of the rebels, which is linked to the thorny problem of the refugees in the Great Lakes region, must be based on agreement among all the countries concerned and there are many of them in our area.

3. A peace process that is still moving forward

6. There are two aspects to the Burundian peace process: the domestic aspect and the external one. Based on the national debate, the domestic initiative is designed to bring about general support on the part of the population for the

peace plan and to ensure their full participation. Several seminars and conferences attended by representatives of all the political forces have already been organized. Two high-level round tables have been held and the conclusions reached at them are among the more encouraging ones. Preparations are under way for a third round table. The Government and the Parliament have been working together for many months in order to direct the peace process and promote reconciliation. A joint delegation of the two institutions has just completed a number of missions to explain their objectives in the region.

7. The mediator, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, recently informed me at a workshop on the resolution of conflicts in Africa held in Arusha at the beginning of the year that he would give the greatest consideration to the domestic aspect of the peace process and that he was even ready to send his representative to Bujumbura.

8. Externally, the negotiation process had achieved some results and it would be unfair to pass over them in silence. Peace talks were begun in Rome between the Government and the main armed group, the Conseil national de défense de la démocratie (CNDD) before they were blocked by a premature disclosure on the part of the latter partner. A peace conference attended by approximately 50 representatives of Burundian political forces and about 30 international observers was held at the headquarters of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) from 26 to 28 September 1997. A similar meeting was just held in Fribourg, Switzerland, with the assistance of Africa Synergies.

9. The Arusha initiative has not made much headway owing to a lack of flexibility on the part of the mediation body and a methodology based on force, occasional military constraint and violence, which proved to be, as was to be expected, completely counterproductive. We shall now touch upon a number of aspects which constitute major obstacles to the peace process.

4. <u>The economic sanctions are blocking the peace process</u>

10. These measures, which were very hastily decided upon on 31 July 1996, are unlimited with regard to their objective and duration and are illegal and unfair, added a series of misfortunes and suffering to the already pitiable drama caused by the civil conflict. Professor Pinheiro, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the human rights situation in Burundi recently stressed, at the end of last year, the disastrous consequences of the economic blockade.

11. It was generally thought that the latest Summit in Kampala was to have lifted the sanctions as, moreover, had been proposed by the Council of Ministers in preparing for the Summit.

12. From Brazzaville to Hanoi, in Harare, Ouagadougou, Tripoli, Lomé, Addis Ababa, Lusaka (Comesa), Dakar, Paris, Rome, Libreville and Geneva, major international forums and leading institutions have strongly condemned these measures, which have led to the starvation and death of the poorest people while at the same time enriching the wealthiest in the region.

5. The harmful role played by certain neighbouring countries

13. The failure to respect the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees by certain neighbouring countries as well as the hospitality provided to the rebel groups does not favour the creation of an atmosphere conducive to dialogue. The acts of violence perpetrated by the armed groups strengthens the front made up of those who are opposed to negotiations.

14. The establishment of a tripartite commission on the repatriation of Burundian refugees represents a positive approach. The success of this mechanism will depend on the contribution by the political decision makers.

15. Other actions also may promote the peace process.

6. Promoting communication

16. The continuing isolation to which Burundi has been subjected as a result of the blockade demonstrates in essence a refusal to engage in dialogue. The closing of the air, land, lake and other frontiers has sealed off the physical channels of any communication among human beings. This ostracism reflects a hermetic approach, not a relationship based on dialogue, which is characterized by openness and seeks to bring together and reconcile parties. We therefore call for the lifting of all these barriers to the peace process.

7. Burundi must be at the centre of any search for a lasting solution

17. The manoeuvres aimed at excluding Burundi from meetings at which it constitutes the agenda must cease. The Burundian people are not prepared to accept instructions without consultation. Furthermore, in Africa one does not shave the head of a man who is not present.

8. The Government of Burundi is maintaining its commitments

18. While strengthening security and pursuing the peace process, the Government has gradually prepared the way for meeting a number of the conditions set by the Arusha group. The following steps have already been taken:

Re-establishment of political parties;

Resumed functioning of Parliament;

Holding of peace conferences and negotiations;

Dismantling of most of the sites for protecting the displaced and regrouped persons;

Release of all the key figures concerned.

19. Former President Ntibantunganya, former President Bagaza and the President of the National Assembly today enjoy complete freedom of movement. The Public Ministry, owing to a lack of conclusive evidence, has just closed the case concerning Mr. Léonce Ngendakumana, the President of the National Assembly.

Conclusion

20. The Government of Burundi wishes once again to thank the Security Council for all the consideration accorded to our country here today. We should be grateful if you:

Maintained your support for the peace process in Burundi and helped to improve the atmosphere and the chances for success;

Supported the lifting of the economic sanctions in order to give peace a chance;

Acceded to our request concerning the establishment of an international criminal court on Burundi in order to judge crimes against humanity and genocide;

Advocated not only humanitarian assistance but also reconstruction and the resumption of development cooperation.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1998/244
17 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement of the Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 12 March, Juche 87 (1998).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) LI Hyong Chol
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement of the Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, issued on 12 March, Juche 87 (1998)

Of late, the situation on the Korean peninsula has become further strained owing to the reckless manoeuvres of the United States of America in pursuance of its arms build-up in south Korea.

While it speaks of a fictitious "surprise attack" from one quarter and of a security "vacuum", with the impetus of the recent Iraqi crisis, the United States is introducing en masse the latest military equipment into south Korea and raising a ruckus of war preparations against us.

As has already been reported, Mr. Tilelli, Commander of the United States forces in south Korea, told the National Security Committee of the United States House of Representatives on 4 March that the latest-type commanding aircraft, J. Stars, had been "confirmed, as a result of its first use in military exercises, to be useful in an emergency on the Korean peninsula" and that it would be deployed in the United States-south Korean combined forces soon.

In anticipation of a "case emergency", the United States intends to deploy for action in south Korea this commanding aircraft known as the "flying operation command post" for management functions in the combined operation of the overall forces along with the control functions of an air warning plane. This itself constitutes a very dangerous intention.

Earlier, the Commander of the United States Pacific Forces, Joseph Prueher, in a press interview on 20 February, admitted that the United States had brought in 25 F-15-E jet fighters and 2 AC-130 helicopter gunships to south Korea from the United States mainland. He alleged that the aircraft deployment in south Korea was necessary to "maintain an effective deterrent".

According to him, the United States has completed its long-distance attack training to strike us with B-52 strategic bombers taking off from its mainland, put one aircraft carrier on standby on a permanent basis to move immediately to the coast of the Korean peninsula and placed the United States forces of three services under war preparedness so that they can be reinforced and introduced into south Korea within 18 hours.

It is no longer a secret that the United States, in February alone, sent reinforcements of several fighter-bombers and two gunships to south Korea and has an offensive nuclear submarine under the United States Seventh Fleet in port at Jinhae.

The massive reinforcement of the latest type of military hardware in south Korea has been timed to coincide with the Iraq crisis. This cannot be construed otherwise than an extremely dangerous scheme to test their new "win-win strategy" for the first time on the Korean peninsula.

Even the high-ranking officials of the United States military are openly talking about this.

The United States has up to now continually repeated its catchphrase that it has an interest in the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula at the various rounds of negotiations with us.

However, all the facts show that the United States continues to conduct in full battle gear its war preparations against its adversary behind the scenes of the dialogue.

Such being the situation, this only leads us to reconsider the prospects of the upcoming "four-way talks" and other negotiations with the United States.

The reckless arms build-up of the United States is gravely placing us on a high state of alert. It is an outrageous violation of the DPRK-United States Agreed Framework on putting an end to the long-standing hostile relations between the two countries and improving the relations between them.

It is axiomatic that we cannot expect to carry on a genuine dialogue with an adversary that can only find opportunities to do harm to its counterpart, with a dagger hidden in its breast pocket.

The hostile acts committed by the United States against the DPRK require us to maintain a high degree of vigilance and keep at full preparedness to cope with both dialogue and war.

Since the United States continues to concentrate on its reckless attempt to beef up its armed forces with war preparations against the DPRK, we cannot but take countermeasures. And if the enemy dares to provoke us, our people and the revolutionary armed forces will deal a merciless death blow to the provokers and decisively foil their attempts to carry out their "win-win strategy".

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach the text of an excerpt relating to the occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, from a press release issued at the sixty-sixth session of the Council of Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, held in Riyadh from 7 to 8 March 1998.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad J. SAMHAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Excerpt relating to the occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, from a press release issued at the sixty-sixth session of the Council of Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, held in Riyadh from 7 to 8 March 1998

The Council of Ministers has considered the evolution of the situation concerning the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, which belong to the United Arab Emirates but are occupied by Iran. Once again, it strongly deplores the fact that no progress has been made on this matter, because the Islamic Republic of Iran persists in its refusal to respond to the many serious, sincere appeals made by the United Arab Emirates, the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other regional organizations and institutions with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Reaffirming the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa and renewing its full support for all the peaceful measures taken by the United Arab Emirates to restore their sovereignty over these islands, the Council of Ministers again requests the Iranian Government to put an end to the occupation of the three islands, to renounce its policy of fait accompli, to stop building installations for the purpose of changing the demographic composition of the islands and to destroy the ones it has built, to annul all the unilateral measures it has adopted and to settle the conflict by peaceful means, in accordance with the principles and norms of international law, by agreeing, inter alia, to bring the case before the International Court of Justice.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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17 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF POLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to draw to your attention the text of Decision 218 concerning the situation in Kosovo, adopted at the special session of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on 11 March 1998.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eugeniusz WYZNER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-06835 (E) 170398

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Annex

Decision 218 on the situation in Kosovo, adopted at the special session of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, on 11 March 1998

The Permanent Council, meeting in a special session,

Deeply concerned about the crisis in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and urging those involved to cease unconditionally any form of violence,

Condemning the excessive and indiscriminate use of force during Serb police actions in Kosovo, which have led to the death of some 80 people over the past week,

Stressing the unacceptability of any terrorist action, and calling on all concerned actively to oppose the use of violence to achieve political aims,

Recalling the statements of the Chairman-in-Office of 2 March and 10 March 1998 on the situation in Kosovo,

Recognizing that the crisis in Kosovo is not solely an internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of violations of the principles and commitments of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on human rights and because it has a significant impact on the security of a region, as well as taking into account the need for immediate efforts by the international community to prevent further escalation,

Calling upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanians to assume their responsibility to enter without preconditions into meaningful dialogue, based on full observance of OSCE principles and commitments, including those of the Helsinki Final Act, and expressing the readiness of OSCE to assist in this process,

1. Takes positive note of the activities of the Chairman-in-Office undertaken with regard to the crisis in Kosovo, and encourages him to continue efforts aimed at an effective OSCE contribution to its peaceful resolution;

2. Supports a new mission by Mr. Felipe Gonzalez as the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would include a mandate for addressing the problems in Kosovo;

3. Expresses gratitude for the work of Mr. Max van der Stoel, whose experience and expertise remain invaluable in helping OSCE in its efforts to resolve the problems in the region;

4. Authorizes the following operational measures to be taken to allow adequate observation of the borders with Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the prevention of possible crisis spillover effects, as already requested by the Chairman-in-Office:

- The monitoring capabilities of the OSCE presence in Albania and, as appropriate, the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje will be temporarily enhanced for the fulfilment of those tasks;

- The respective heads of mission will report regularly on their observations;

5. Requests the representatives of the OSCE Troika members accredited in Belgrade to coordinate arrangements for continuous monitoring of the situation in Kosovo by diplomatic representatives in Belgrade of the OSCE participating States. The Permanent Council will be kept informed about relevant findings;

6. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:

- To halt the excessive use of force in Kosovo, to vigorously investigate and to accept the international investigation of reported summary executions and to bring to justice those found responsible;

- To cooperate fully with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office's Personal Representative to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez;

- To initiate a meaningful dialogue with Kosovar Albanian representatives which will lead to concrete steps towards the resolution of ongoing political problems in the region;

- To allow access to Kosovo for the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations;

- To implement without delay the Education Agreement and seek agreements on further confidence-building measures;

- To accept without preconditions, an immediate return of the OSCE missions of long duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, with the understanding that the return of these missions is essential for future participation in OSCE by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

UNITED
NATIONS

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17 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KENYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the communiqué of the sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, held in Djibouti on 16 March 1998.

Please circulate the text of the communiqué as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Njuguna M. MAHUGU, OGW
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-06841 (E) 170398

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Annex

Communiqué of the sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, held in Djibouti on 16 March 1998

1. At the invitation of President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of the Republic of Djibouti, President Daniel T. arap Moi of Kenya and current Chairman of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Vice-President Ali Othman Mohamed Taha of the Sudan and the Hon. Rebecca A. Kadaga, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, representing President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda, met in Djibouti on 16 March 1998. Also participating in the Summit was the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mr. Tekeste Ghebray.

2. The Summit reviewed the 1997 annual report of the IGAD secretariat and the planned activities for 1998, and also reviewed developments in the subregion since the last extraordinary summit held at Nairobi on 8 and 9 July 1997.

3. The Summit adopted the declaration of the seventeenth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of IGAD.

4. The Summit noted with concern that poor infrastructure is hampering development in the subregion. In this regard, partners in development are called upon to fulfil their commitments by expediting support to the development of infrastructure, in particular in roads and the telecommunication sub-sector.

5. The Summit recognized the importance of seeing tangible results in project implementation. Therefore, efforts should be made to ensure that at least a few projects are implemented, in particular in the sub-sectors of roads and water conservation, such as the construction of dams.

6. The Summit reaffirmed the need to continue to assist the Somali people in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict and further stressed that the ultimate responsibility for resolving the conflict rests with the Somali people. The IGAD member States and the international community can only facilitate that process.

7. The Summit noted that the proliferation of parallel initiatives can only undermine the central objective of accelerating the peace process in Somalia. In this respect, the Summit urged all concerned partners to bolster the IGAD peace process in Somalia and ensure that all assistance provided to Somalia is geared to enhancing the peace process and that it is channelled through the IGAD mechanism.

8. The Summit expressed its profound appreciation for the ongoing peace talks on the conflict in southern Sudan brokered by IGAD and underlined the importance of transparency, impartiality and unity of purpose within IGAD as the basis for the success of the peace process. Further, it cautioned against negative external influences detrimental to the peace process in southern Sudan and encouraged the parties to the conflict to work together towards a ceasefire so

as to provide a conducive environment for the next round of talks scheduled for April 1998 in Nairobi.

9. The Summit expressed its admiration to President Daniel T. arap Moi for his able leadership of IGAD for the past three years.

10. The Summit unanimously elected President Hassan Gouled Aptidon as the next Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of IGAD.

11. The Summit expressed its appreciation to President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, the Government and the people of the Republic of Djibouti for hosting the Summit and for the warm welcome and hospitality accorded to the delegations.